Torts - Liability - Sonic Boom by Batson, Robert D.
Journal of Air Law and Commerce
Volume 36 | Issue 1 Article 7
1970
Torts - Liability - Sonic Boom
Robert D. Batson
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/jalc
This Case Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Air Law
and Commerce by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Robert D. Batson, Torts - Liability - Sonic Boom, 36 J. Air L. & Com. 117 (1970)
https://scholar.smu.edu/jalc/vol36/iss1/7
NOTES
Torts - Liability - Sonic Boom
Beginning 3 February 1964 and continuing through 30 July 1964 the
United States conducted a controlled test flight program over the Okla-
homa City area. From one to eight aircraft flying at supersonic speeds
flew over the test area daily at altitudes of from 21,000 to 50,000 feet.
The general purpose of the test was to gain meaningful information con-
cerning the feasibility of developing supersonic commercial aircraft. Spe-
cifically, the test was designed to measure structural response to sonic
booms as well as to "determine the normal reaction of ground population
over a significant period of time to sonic boom pressures . . . ."' Eleven
test houses in the Oklahoma City area, varying in age from new to 50
years old, were used in the program. In five of these houses were placed
instrumentation designed to measure the response of their various struc-
tural components to the sonic booms. Instruments designed to measure
"seismic response" were driven into the ground. Also, three stations were
established to measure the overpressure from the sonic booms. Nine home-
owners filed suits against the United States Government for property dam-
age allegedly resulting from the sonic-boom tests conducted by the Federal
Aviation Administration. Judgments were entered by the District Court
for the Western District of Oklahoma against the United States under the
Federal Tort Claims Act.' It was stipulated that if the judgment of the
district court became final, the government would then pay 60 additional
homeowners a determined amount of damages based on the cost of repairs.
Held, affirmed: Although traditional rules determining proof of causa-
tion require more than mere possibilities, a plaintiff cannot be subjected
to a standard of proof impossible for him to sustain. Appellees' experts
could not testify with certainty because such scientific data does not exist.
Therefore, since proof of causation of damages may only be minimal,
under such circumstances, the standard of proof is met by the introduc-
tion of lay eye-witness testimony complimented by expert opinion which
inferred that the property damage was "likely" caused by sonic booms,
U.S. v. Gravelle, 407 F.2d 964 (10th Cir. 1969).
In the instant case basically three issues were involved:'
(1) Whether, as a matter of law, the plaintiffs failed to sustain their burden
of proving that sonic booms generated by Government aircraft caused
damage to their properties.
'Coxsey v. Hallaby, 334 F.2d 286 (10th Cir. 1964). Tests were conducted at St. Louis, from
July, 1961 through May, 1962; at Oklahoma City from February through July, 1964; at Chicago
from February through March, 1965, and at Edwards Air Force Base in late 1967. Ortner, Sonic
Booms: Containment or Confrontation, 34 J. AiR L. & COM. 208-09 (1968).
28 U.S.C. § 1346(b), (1962).
'407 F.2d 964 (1969).
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
(2) Whether the district court's determination, that the sonic booms caused
the damage, is clearly erroneous.
(3) Assuming that the sonic booms did cause the damage, whether the dis-
trict court erred in not finding that the damage caused was deminimus.
I. SONIC BOoM-A MAN MADE PHENOMENON
A sonic boom is a sound (shock) wave produced when air particles
surrounding a source of energy are set in motion by a surge of that energy.
It has two principal characteristics: (1) A cone of high pressure air con-
sisting of overlapping sound waves crowded closely together, and (2) a
loud cracking sound.' An aircraft in flight collides with air particles in its
path causing these shock waves to form.' Traveling at the speed of sound
these shock waves move out in front of the aircraft.' When supersonic
(faster than the speed of sound) speed is attained, they can no longer
travel out ahead of the aircraft and the waves are propagated in the form
of a high pressure area at an angle almost perpendicular to the line on
which the aircraft is traveling.'
In the late 1950's a number of reports alleging damages resulting from
the shock waves produced by the phenomenon of sonic boom appeared in
newspapers throughout the country. In 1959 an F-104, Starfighter, par-
ticipating in an aerial demonstration at Maxwell Air Force Base, produced
two resounding sonic booms over the municipal airport at Montgomery,
Alabama when it broke the sound barrier. It was discovered that the shock
wave pressure had apparently been concentrated on the air traffic control
tower which was under construction, and that the sheet steel walls of the
tower mounted on aluminum framework had bent as much as three inches
in places, that the bolts and screws holding the wall in place had been
stripped and sheared and that much of the glass in the tower had been
broken. Other parts of the tower appeared completely unaffected! Un-
fortunately for individuals whose property sustained extensive damages
as a result of these booms, recovery was denied because at the time no
experts could be found who would testify that the resulting shock waves
accompanying sonic booms possessed the potentiality for causing damages.
II. FEDERAL RELIEF FOR SONIC BOOM DAMAGE
A. Federal Tort Claims Act
An action against the government for damage caused by sonic boom is
perhaps best pursued within the statutory remedies provided for in the
Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA).' Claims may be maintained under the
"See Castellanos, Federal Liability for Sonic Boom Damage, 31 So. CAL. LAW REv. 260-61
(1958).,
' Sonic Boom, 5 Air Force Document, these reports are prepared by the United States Air Force
and are based on studies conducted at Wright Air Development Center, Wright-Patterson Air Force
Base, Ohio. The particular documents referred to in this note were obtained and cited by Castellanos,
supra note 4. Hereinafter these reports will be cited as Air Force Document.
6 Id.
I Id.
'Varner, The Nature of Sonic Booms, 23 ALA. L. Rev. 344 (1962).
The relevant provisions of the Federal Torts Claim Act provide:
Subject to the provisions of Chapter 171 [§§ 2671-80] of this title, the district
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FTCA either administratively by means of section 2672, or through a civil
action brought in federal court under section 1346.0 Existing statutes do
authorize heads of departments to make administrative settlements of
claims (not to exceed 1,000 dollars) against the United States, for damage
to real or personal property, and for personal injury or death, caused by
a "wrongful act or omission" by an employee of the Government."
A similiar alternative administrative remedy is possible under the Mili-
tary Claims Act which allows recovery for acts of employees of a military
department irrespective of whether the alleged wrongful activity was
negligent."2 Administrative settlement provisions of the FTCA and the
Military Claims Act are alternative remedies; and the filing of a claim for
an administrative settlement constitutes an election of this remedy, to the
preclusion, or limitation, of a subsequent civil action for damages."
B. Federal Tort Liability
Section 1346 of the FTCA gives the district court concurrent jurisdic-
tion with the Court of Claims for money damages for injury to or loss of
property, or personal injury or death "caused by any employee of the
government while acting within the scope of his office or employment."'"
The Act defines "employee of the Government" as including ". . . officers
or employees of any federal agency ...and persons acting on behalf of
a federal agency in an official capacity .... .""1 The term "federal agency"
is defined ". . . not to include any contractor with the United States. ' ' "e
Thus, an injured party would have no recourse against the government
where an aircraft producing damaging sonic boom was piloted by a test
pilot in the employ of a private aviation company which is under con-
tract to the government.
17
A suit may be brought against the United States (with its consent)
under this provision, for the recovery of money damages on certain tort
actions ". . . under circumstances where the United States, if a private
person, would be liable ... in accordance with the law of the place where
the act or omission occurred."'" Therefore, federal liability for sonic boom
courts . . . shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on claims against the
United States, for money damages . . . for injury or loss of property, or personal
injury, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omis-
sion of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office
or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person
would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act
or omission occurred. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1962).
The United States shall be liable, respecting the provisions of this relating to tort
claims, in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like
circumstances, but shall not be liable for interest prior to judgment or for punitive
damages. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1964).
"°28 U.S.C. 55 2672, 1346 (1962).
"10 U.S.C. 2733, 2735 (Supp. IV, 1957); 14 U.S.C. S 645 (Supp. IV, 1957); 28 U.S.C.
§ 2672 (1964).
1" 10 U.S.C. § 2731-2735 (Supp. IV, 1957).
13U.S. v. Gaidys, 194 F.2d 762, 764 (10th Cir. 1952); 31 So. CAL. LAW REv,. 275 (1958).
1436 Stat. 1093 (1911), 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a) (2) (1962).
5 28 U.S.C. § 2671 (1964).
16 Id.
"7 Hartman v. U.S., C.D. Cal. Civ. No. 62-760 F, Oct. 31, 1967.
'828 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1962).
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damage must be determined by an application of local tort law. The ap-
propriateness of the applicability of such theories of recovery as "strict
liability," "trespass on theory of dynamite blasting," "res ipsa loquitur,"
and "negligence" will therefore vary in accordance with the particular
district court having jurisdiction to adjudicate the action. Also, in a de-
termination as to whether or not the employee was acting within the scope
of his employment at the time the alleged tort was committed, the district
court applies the "... law of the place where the act or omission oc-
curred.""
The liability of the United States is expressly not extended to claims
based upon "the exercise or performance or failure to exercise or perform
a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or em-
ployee of the government, whether or not the discretion involved be
abused.""0 The court in Dalehite v. United States ruled that this provision,
includes more than the initiation of programs and activities. It also includes
determinations made by executives or administrators in establishing plans,
specifications, or schedules of operations. Where there is room for policy judg-
ment and decision there is discretion. It necessarily follows that the acts of
subordinates in carrying out the operations of government in accordance with
official directions cannot be actionable.'
The FTCA does not define "discretionary function;" and each case must
be measured against a broad spectrum of administrative power which ranges
from an establishment of programs, the issuance of regulations, and the
granting of licenses, to narrow decisions where administrative discretion
stops and liability in tort begins. There is no exact test to distinguish acts
of discretion within the purview of the exception to the FTCA retaining
governmental immunity for the consequences of acts within the perform-
ance of discretionary functions, and the court must look to the nature and
quality of the discretion involved in the acts complained of in each case."
As a consequence of this broad rule of application, subsequent cases have
not as yet established any consistent trend concerning the proper applica-
tion of the "discretionary function" exception. The result has been con-
fusion concerning which acts by governmental employees will be defined
as planning functions and which will be considered operational. Thus, in
Williams v. United States,' after citing Dalehite, the court dismissed a
claim for damages suffered as a result of a mysterious explosion of an Air
Force jet bomber on the grounds that the aircraft was participating in
experimental activities of interest to "national security" and such activities
fall within the discretionary function exception.
However, the exception was held inapplicable in Bulloch v. United States
in which sheep owners sought damages to their herds caused by nuclear
19 Id.
2028 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1962).
2' 346 U.S. 15 (1953).
"28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1962), 2680(a) (1964); Swanner v. U.S., 275 F. Supp. 1007 (1967).
23115 F. Supp. 386-88 (N.D. Fla. 1953), aff'd on another ground, 218 F.2d 473 (5th Cir.
1955).
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tests conducted by the Atomic Energy Commission." Of particular inter-
est to plaintiffs seeking recovery for damages allegedly caused by sonic
boom, the court in Schwartz v. United States held that the FTCA did not
confer jurisdiction over an action for damages from sonic boom allegedly
resulting from operation of an aircraft by Air Force officers, where it
appeared that authorization of the supersonic flights was an exercise of
delegated policy judgment."
This exception denying coverage under the FTCA for claims based
upon an exercise or performance of a discretionary function on the part
of a federal agency or employee is available to the government only as a
defense, properly pleaded and proved, is not jurisdictional, and can be
waived. Thus, in Neher v. United States," it was unnecessary to make a
determination as to whether or not the government employee's perform-
ance was operational because the government, by pre-trial stipulation,
had waived its "discretionary function" defense.
III. THEORIES OF RECOVERY
One claiming under the FTCA should frame his pleadings on a theory
of negligence or trespass, since section 2680 (h) exempts the federal gov-
ernment from liability for assault and battery, and the theory of strict
liability has generally been held inapplicable in actions brought against the
government under either section 1346 (b) or 2674 (1964) .7
A. Negligence
There are four traditional elements of a cause of action in negligence,
which the plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of evidence; which
elements may be stated as follows:
(1) A duty, or obligation recognized by the law, requiring the actor to con-
form to a certain standard of conduct, for the protection of others
against unreasonable risks."s
A risk is a danger which is apparent, to one in the position of the actor. 9
(2) A failure on his part to conform to the standard required.'
Men with special skills are required by law not only to exercise reasonable
care but also to possess a minimum of special knowledge and ability.
(3) A reasonably close connection between the conduct and the resulting
injury; or, the "proximate or legal cause."'
Causation, notes Prosser, "embraces all things which have so far con-
24 33 F. Supp. 885 (D. Utah 1955).
25 38 F.R.D. 164 (1965); Huslander v. U.S., 234 F. Supp. 1004 (1964), Williams v. U.S., 115
F. Supp. 386 (N.D. Fla. 1953),aff'd, 218 F.2d 473 (1955).
26265 F. Supp. 210 (1967), 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1964).
2728 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1962); 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1964); Dalehitc v. U.S., 346 U.S. 15
(1953); Stratton v. U.S., 213 F. Supp. 1962 (E.D. Tenn. 1962).2 8 W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 146 (3d ed. 1964).
21Id. at 149.
2 1Od. at 146.
31 Id.
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tributed to the result that without them it would not have occurred." 2
The defendant's omissions may be as critical an element in determining
causation as his commissions. However, it is of importance to note that an
actor's omission is not regarded as a cause of an event if the particular
event would have occurred without it. Thus the defendant's conduct must
be of such a substantial nature, as determined by a jury, that the event
would not have occurred without it."
(4) An actual loss or damage resulting to the interests of another must be
shown; i.e., nominal damages to vindicate a technical rights, cannot be
recovered in a negligence action where no actual loss has occurred. 4
That sonic booms can cause physical damage to property is now common
knowledge. The reasonably prudent aviator must exercise care to prevent
the foreseeable harm of sonic boom damage. The negligent act itself might
be flying at too great a speed at a low altitude, executing horizontal turns
too quickly, or descending too rapidly at supersonic speeds. The altitude
of flight is significant, since the energy of a shock wave is diminished by
the friction created in its passage through air. At lower altitudes, shock
waves produced by supersonic flight are not sufficiently dissipated to pro-
tect one's property from the impact of the waves. It may also be relevant
to consider the flight path of the aircraft, i.e., whether the path of flight
producing the sonic booms is horizontal or vertical to the ground. Where
a Mach cone (a phenomenon of amassing shock waves, resembling the
cone of a funnel, produced by an aircraft when supersonic speed is at-
tained)' is produced while an aircraft is diving, or flying vertically, the
cone's apex (where the strongest pressure is exerted by the force of the
compressed shock waves) is projected toward the ground, thus creating
increased air pressure ("overpressure") on the surface of the earth as well
as the structures constructed upon that surface."2
The element of causation, establishing that the overpressure produced
by the sonic boom was the proximate cause of structural damage to one's
property, is the most difficult and most critical factor to establish when
the theory of negligence is argued. There is at present considerable dis-
agreement among the experts concerning the extent of damage that a
sonic boom can cause. In tests conducted by Air Force scientists in 1962,
it was claimed that 70 pounds of pressure per square foot are required
to damage even flimsy structures, and that the highest recorded sonic boom
pressure was 331 pounds per square foot which was registered under test
conditions on the top of a mountain where the aircraft was only 280
feet distant. 7 From these test results the Air Force concluded that "struc-
tural damage to property was relatively impossible where overpressures
32Id. at 241.
3
"Id. at 241-43.34 1d. at 146.
3' Air Force Document 5, supra note 5.
" Air Force Document 9-10, supra note 5; Goldwater, Sonic Boom, PLANES, May, 1957, at 5;
Roth, Sonic Boom a New Legal Problem, 44 A.B.A.J. 217 (1958); Strum, About the Sonic Boom,
THE AIRMAN, Sept. 1957, at 45.
37 JAG. BULL. 10, 12 (March-April 1, 1962); Air Force Document A-11.
[Vol. 36
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ranged from 2 to 5 pounds per square foot (the range of overpressures
produced by supersonic training maneuvers), and that plaster and window
damage could occur only in isolated cases where a stress was preexistent
due to a flaw in the glass or in its installation. ' '"s On the other hand, the
Federal Aviation Agency's Office of Plans has since reported that "over-
pressures of 2 to 2.9 pounds per square foot cause considerable damage to
glass and plaster, and that overpressures of 2.9 to 4.9 pounds per square
foot cause widespread window and plaster damage, as well as minor struc-
tural damage to frames and walls.' Since neither of these two positions is
widely accepted, the issue as to what conditions are necessary for sonic
booms to cause structural damage is still subject to considerable disagree-
ment. In light of this controversy the plaintiff must present evidence which
will convince the fact-finder that the sonic boom was the "substantial
factor" which caused the damage to his property, in addition to establish-
ing that the boom was the product of a negligent act of a government
employee functioning within his official capacity." The problem of estab-
lishing causation in sonic boom claims is illustrated by an analysis of the
court's decision in Dabney v. United States.' Relying on the calculations
gathered in tests conducted by the government, the court held that the
plaintiffs' testimony concerning damages to their property following a
sonic boom was insufficient to establish proximate cause. In that case the
plaintiffs testified that shortly after the extremely loud sound, a subse-
quent inspection of their premises revealed cracks in the foundation of
their homes, wrinkled wallpaper, buckled hardwood floors and a broken
water pipe. Apparently the court was not convinced that the damages did
not simply develop gradually as the buildings settled over the years and
merely went unnoticed until the sonic boom incident occured. However,
it seems more likely that the court was simply more impressed by un-
challenged scientific data than by mere lay testimony. In another case in
which plaintiffs were unsuccessful in establishing damages as a result of
a sonic boom, testimony that plaster cracks in their building were observed
only after the occurrence of a sonic boom was held to be insufficient to
establish that the sonic boom was the proximate cause of the damage.
The court pointed out that the plaintiffs' case was weakened by the fact
that no glass damage of any type was reported even though glass is the
part of a structure the most susceptible to damage by a shock such as that
created by a sonic boom.'
In 1967, in Neher v. United States' the court took judicial notice of
a distinction between cause and effect raised by testimony involving scien-
tific and legal causation. For example, in discussing a window broken by
a boom of very great strength, the scientific testimony entered by the
18 Air Force Document B-13; Air Force Document C-9; Goldwater supra note 36, at 5.
" McKinley, Response of Glass in Windows to Sonic Booms, 4 MATERIALS & STAND. 594, 595
(1964).4 0
PROSSER, supra note 28, at 244.
4' 334 F.2d 286 (1964).
4 Id. at 600.
4
'Neher v. U.S., 265 F. Supp. 211 (D.C. Minn. 1967).
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government states that the window did not break because of excessive
pressure per se, "but because the window, which was opened at the time,
was slammed by the boom and the slamming broke the window."' Noting
that this approach to cause and effect was apparent throughout the testi-
mony, the court emphasized that "this type of cause is not the same as
proximate cause, which accomplished the damage." Persuaded by impressive
expert testimony for the plaintiffs, which raised considerable doubt as to
the conclusiveness of the government's test-produced data, and which was
complemented by the testimony of the plaintiffs themselves, the court
found that the sonic boom had in fact been established as the proximate
cause of the plaintiffs' damages.'
Where a plaintiff is unable to ascertain the exact reason for production
of the damaging overpressures, the doctrine of "res ipsa loquitur" would
be beneficial once it was proved the damage was caused by a sonic boom."5
Alternative pleadings have been allowed in various aviation cases to intro-
duce evidence of specific acts of negligence without precluding the applic-
ability of "res ipsa loquitur." Not only is the plaintiff confronted with the
problem of providing evidence to show the aircraft's altitude and flight
path and to establish in fact who was operating the aircraft; 7 but, com-
plete preparation in sonic boom damage litigation requires knowledge in-
volving several highly technical sciences, such as aerodynamics, the theory
of flight, principles of jet propulsion, jet engines, aircraft structures, radar
principles, communications and electronics, meteorology, navigation, stress-
es, building codes, manufacturing processes, and so forth.48
Three classic conditions are required for the application of "res ipsa
loquitur."
(1) The event must be of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the
absence of negligence.'
This criterion is based on probability. The requirement is "only another
way of stating an obvious principle of circumstantial evidence: that the
event must be such that in the light of ordinary experience it gives rise
to an inference that someone must have been negligent."" °
(2) The instrumentality causing the injury must be under the exclusive
control of the defendant. 1
In "res ipsa loquitur" this is accomplished by a process of elimination in
which the most reasonable of all the possible causes of the plaintiff's in-
jury are those shown to be controlled by the defendant.
4Id. at 218.
45 Id.
46 Note, 32 J. AIR L. & COM. 602 (1966).
" Desert Beach Corp. v. U.S., 128 F. Supp. 581 (S.D. Cal. 1955) (written gist of decision).
4' Roth, supra note 36, at 276; 31 So. CAL. LAW REV. 270 (1958).
'
4 W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 39 (2d ed. 1955); J. WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE AN-
GLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW 2509(A) (3d ed. 1940).
50 3 3 J. AIR L. & COM. 711 (1967).
.5 PROSSER, supra note 28, at 218; Foltis Inc. v. New York, 287 N.Y. 108, 38 N.E.2d 455
(1941).
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(3) The plaintiff must not have contributed to his own injury."
Courts which refuse to impose strict liability in aviation cases allow the
"res ipsa" doctrine as an aid to the plaintiff in establishing a breach of
duty. 3 However, in a 1964 case, the court held that the United States
could not be held negligent for the mere creation of a sonic boom. A
failure to prove "negligence or wrongful act" on the part of the govern-
ment would prohibit the application of the doctrine of "res ipsa loquitur."'
The plaintiffs, who discovered plaster cracks in their walls and ceilings
nine days after a sonic boom occurred, had failed to show that the damage
which had in fact occurred to their home was proximately caused by the
sonic boom.
Although the third condition presents no problem, the second condition
requiring that the agent or instrumentality which caused the injury be
within the exclusive control of the defendant, may raise certain difficul-
ties. Convincing a judge, in a jurisdiction which applies the second condi-
tion quite literally and strictly, that the shock wave causing the damage
was within the "exclusive control" of the defendant may be troublesome.5
Care must be observed to establish that the airplane, and not the boom, is
the instrumentality causing damage. However, most jurisdictions do not
require proof of literal "control" at the time of the accident."
B. Trespass
Another possible theory in bringing a sonic boom damage claim against
the government under section 1346(b) of the FTCA would be an action
in trespass.
The Restatement of Torts states that liability for trespass exists only in
the case of an intentional intrusion, negligence, or some "extra-hazardous
activity" on the part of the defendant. 7 The Restatement has abandoned
any distinction between direct and indirect invasions where there is an
actual entry of a person or thing upon the plaintiff's land, and classes both
as trespass. 8 Historically, in cases involving trespass to land, there has
been an insistence of some courts that the entry be by something tangible
(visible to the naked eye) before trespass can be found." However, there
are new decisions finding a trespass in the entry of invisible gases and
microscopic particles, where they do harm."' Nevertheless, when local law
has not relaxed the tight requirement of physical invasion, it is doubtful
that a plaintiff will be able to establish that a sufficient interference with
52 PROSSER, supra note 28, at 218.
53 In Boyd v. White, 128 Cal. App. 2d 641, 276 P.2d 92 (Ct. App. 1954), ruling aircraft not
so dangerous as to be ultra-hazardous, marks the modern trend to disregard the 1938 Restatement
of Torts deeming aircraft operations within ultra-hazardous activity.
4 Brown v. U.S., 230 F. Supp. 774, 776 (D.C. Mass. 1964).
" Castellano, supra note 4, at 271.
5 Terrell v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 204 Okla. 24, 226 P.2d 431 (1950); Kilgore v.
Shepard Co., 52 R.I. 151, 158 A. 720 (1932).
57 PROSSER, supra note 49, at 205 (1955).
"'28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1962).
5' RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 166 (1938).
6
'RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, comment h at 158 (1938).
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his interest in the exclusive possession of his land was violated by a sonic
boom."1
The action for trespass to chattels may be appropriate in sonic boom
claims. In modern usage, trespass to chattels has become exclusively a
wrong of intentional interference with the chattel in possession of the de-
fendant." The necessary element of "intent" requires no wrongful mo-
tive; it is merely an intent to effect a result and extends not only to those
consequences which are desired, but also to those which the actor knows
or should know are substantially sure to follow from what he does."
Thus, an action for trespass to chattels may be appropriate where a sonic
boom is created over a populated area causing extensive damages.
An analogy might be drawn between an "explosion" produced by a
blasting operation and a sonic boom. An "explosion" basically is a violent
and extremely rapid expansion of gases and particles which causes a loud
noise and which follows the sudden production of great pressure."
There is general agreement that a sonic boom is also a pressure wave
accompanied by noise." Therefore sonic boom and concussion shock waves
are abnormal pressure forces which originate outside the premises affected.
The majority of states today find liability for concussion or vibration
damages; that is, they refuse to distinguish between cases where rocks are
thrown onto a plaintiff's property and where his property is damaged by
the concussion of a blast. Under these circumstances the courts find
trespass in both situations."6 The reasoning in the opinion of Exner v.
Sherman Power Constr. Co., is typical of courts which allow recovery for
vibration damages:
Yet in every practical sense there can be no difference between a blasting
which projects rocks in such a way as to injure persons or property and a
blasting which, by creating a vacuum, shatters buildings or knocks down
people.*
A legal obstacle which may deny the effectiveness of this aproach is
establishing a convincing argument that will bring the meaning of sonic
boom within the definition of "explosion." Although the phenomenon of
sonic boom is very similar to the scientific understanding of explosion,
courts have thus far refused to take judicial notice of the fact that a sonic
boom is an explosion."' The court in Bear Bros., Inc. v. Fidelity and Guar.
Ins. Underwriters Inc." noted that the term "sonic boom," defined in its
61 PROSSER, supra note 28, at 66.
62Greg v. Delhi-Taylor Oil Corp., 162 Tex. 26, 344 S.W.2d 411 (1961); Fairview Farms Inc.
v. Reynolds Metals Co., 176 F. Supp. 178 (D. Ore. 1959).
6"Martin v. Reynolds Metals Co., 221 Or. 86, 342 P.2d 790 (1959); Amphitheaters, Inc. v.
Portland Meadows, 184 Ore. 336, 198 P.2d 847 (1948); 5 A.L.R.2d 690.
6 4 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 217, 222 (1938).
62 PROSSER, supra note 28, at 31, 32.
66Lever Bros. Co. v. Atlas Assur. Co., 131 F.2d 770 (7th Cir. 1942); 32 J. AIR L. & COM.
600 (1966); Hyman & Co. v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 136 F. Supp. 30, 834 (D.D.C. 1955);
Sweeney v. Blue Anchor Beverage Co., 325 Pa. 216, 189 A. 331, 335 (1937).6 Varner, The Nature of Sonic Booms, 23 ALA. L.J. 344 (1948).
66PROSSER, supra note 28, at 529 (1964); Exner v. Sherman Power Constr. Co., 54 F.2d 510
(2d Cir. 1931); Britton v. Harrison Constr. Co., 87 F. Supp. 405 (S.D. W.Va. 1948); Johnson v.
Kansas City Terminal R.R., 182 Mo. App. 349, 170 S.W. 456 (1914).
69 54 F.2d 510, 514 (2d Cir. 1931).
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"ordinary and popular sense," differs in the characteristics applicable to
the meaning of explosion.
Although trespass is still a sound theory of recovery in cases involving
concussion damages resulting from blasting, the more appropriate approach
in "blasting-concussion" analogy is to allege that the defendant is strictly
liable because he is engaged in an "ultra-hazardous" activity."0 According
to the Restatement of Torts, "an activity is ultra-hazardous if it (a)
necessarily involves a risk of serious harm to the person, land or chattels
of others which cannot be eliminated by the exercises of the utmost care,
and (b) is not a matter of common usage."'"
While aviation is expressly labeled as an ultra-hazardous activity by
the Restatement of Torts," the recognized statistical safety record of mod-
ern commercial aviation has raised the status of aviation so that it is no
longer viewed as an ultra-hazardous activity. 3 Nevertheless, supersonic
flights might be viewed as an "ultra-hazardous" operation which is likely
to propagate a destructive force of energy in the form of a sonic boom.
Dean Prosser suggests that strict liability might be applicable to "ab-
normal" aviation in which he includes sonic boom. 4
In 1967 an interesting case on sonic boom liability was decided by a
district court in South Carolina.' Under a South Carolina statute the
owner of an aircraft is absolutely liable for injuries to persons or property
on the ground beneath his flight path; infliction of injuries or damages by
operation of an airplane in itself is a wrongful act giving rise to liability.
Under this section the United States has been held liable under the FTCA
when such damages are inflicted by airplanes operated by government em-
ployees on business for the United States. 6 The government contended that
strict liability had been ruled inapplicable by Dalehite v. United States
to actions brought under the Tort Claims Act." Therefore, the govern-
ment insisted that it was incumbent upon the plaintiffs to prove negligence
in the operation of the aircraft in order to maintain their actions. Although
the court refused to be persuaded that it should overrule the validity of
the South Carolina statute, it did find that the plaintiffs had failed to
establish by the preponderance of the evidence that the flight of the gov-
ernment aircraft over their property was the proximate cause of the dam-
ages. The plaintiffs had testified that none of the damage existed prior to
the overflight and that such damage was found immediately thereafter,
"'J.E. Alexander v. Fireman's Ins. Co., 317 S.W.2d 752 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959); Bear Brothers,
Inc. v. Fidelity and Guaranty Insurance Underwriters, Inc., 6 Av. Cas. 17,497 (Ala. Cir. Ct. 1959).
71 6 Av. Cas. 17,497 (Ala. Cir. Ct. 1959); for Supreme Court ruling that concept definitions
are to be given their "ordinary and popular sense" meaning, see Mitchell v. Potomac Ins. Co., 183
U.S. 42, 52-53 (1901).
72PRossER, 31, 32; Whitley, Blasting-Basis of Liability: Negligence, Trespass or Absolute Li-
ability, 40 N.C.L. REv. 641 (1962).
73 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 520, comment (c) (1938).
74Id. at § 520, comment (b); 522, comment (b).
758 AM. JUR. 2d Aviation § 64 (1963); Boyd v. White, 128 Cal. App. 2d 641, 276 P.2d 92
(1st D.C.A. 1954); U.S. v. Schultetus, 277 F.2d 322 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 828 (1960);
King v. U.S., 178 F.2d 320 (5th Cir. 1949); Johnson v. Central Aviation Corp., 103 Cal. App. 2d
1022, 229 P.2d 114 (1951).
" PROSSER, supra note 28, at 532.
"Lorick v. U.S., 267 F. Supp. 96 (1967).
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and thus could support an inference of causal relationship between the
overflight and the alleged damages. The court acknowledged that under
certain circumstances such an inference might be justifiable, but in this
case irrefutable logic indicated that the damages were not the type normally
found to occur from the sonic boom phenomena. 8
Since government liability under the FTCA turns on the local treatment
of blasting-concussion cases, it is of interest to note that while a minority
of courts deny recovery unless a negligent or intentional invasion is shown,"
the greater number of the courts impose strict liability." However, it
must be pointed out that in order to recover from the government, negli-
gence will have to be shown, as the rules of strict liability do not generally
apply in actions brought against the government under either section
1346(b) or 2674.81 In Dalehite v. United States the court said briefly
that the "statute requires a negligent act" and that the word wrongful
"is not added to the jurisdictional grant with any overtones of the absolute
liability theory."" There is some case law to the effect that there may be
strict liability for conduct which is "operational" as distinguished from
decisions made at the planning level, but, as Dean Prosser notes, "in all
probability further legislation will be required before strict liability is im-
posed upon the United States."83 This conclusion is consistent with the view
of the Restatement which excepts from strict liability an ultra-hazardous
activity "... carried on in the pursuance of public duty."
C. Nuisance, Unconstitutional Taking
Nuisance as a cause of action in sonic boom cases appears doubtful for
a number of reasons. The Restatement of Torts recognizes that an action
for damages can be maintained for a "non-trespassory" invasion of one's
"interests in the private use and enjoyment" of one's land, provided the
invasion is "substantial" and "unreasonable." 5 Today, liability for nuis-
ance may rest upon an intentional invasion of the plaintiff's interests, or
a negligent one, or conduct which is abnormal and out of place with its
surroundings."8 The duration or reoccurrence of the interference, although
not conclusive, is a factor in determining whether the damage is so sub-
stantial as to amount to a nuisance. The loud noise produced by a sonic
boom may be irritable, but it ordinarily does not last very long. The
78 U.S. v. Praylon, 208 F.2d 291 (4th Cir. 1953); U.S. v. Pendergrast, 241 F.2d 687 (4th Cir.
1957); Parcell v. U.S., 104 F. Supp. 110 (S.D. W.Va. 1951).
79 346 U.S. 15 (1953).
88267 F. Supp. 101, 102 (D.C. S.C. 1967).
8 1 Booth v. Rome, W & O.T.R.R., 140 N.Y. 267, 25 N.E. 592 (1893).
82 PROSSER, supra note 49, at 336 (1955); Whitman Hotel Corp. v. Elliot & Watrous Eng. Co.,
137 Conn. 562, 79 A.2d 591 (1951); Bedell v. Groulter, 199 Ore. 344, 261 P.2d 842 (1953).
8328 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1962) or § 2674 (1964); South Carolina allows application of strict
liability; Lorick v. U.S., 267 F. Supp. 96 (1967).
84346 U.S. 15 (1953); Stratton v. United States, 213 F. Supp. 556 (E.D. Tenn. 1962); Harris
v. U.S., 205 F.2d 765 (10th Cir. 1952).
85 PROSSER, supra note 28, at 1001.
" RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 520, comment b; 522, comment b (1938).
87 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 822 (1939); Prosser, supra note 49, at 416-17 (1955).
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plaintiff must be expected to endure some inconvenience rather than cur-
tail the defendant's freedom."
Whereas trespass is an invasion of the plaintiff's interest in exclusive
possession of his land, nuisance requires a "substantial" interference with
the plaintiff's use and enjoyment of his property. The Restatement reads
that if the invasion ". . . involves a detrimental change in the physical
condition of the land . . . " it interferes with plaintiff's use of the land;
it is actionable only if it is a ". . . real and appreciable interference with
the present usability . . ." of the land.89 The type of damage caused by
sonic boom to the physical condition of the land would not generally be
"real and appreciable." In addition, there is no liability for nuisance un-
less the defendant's conduct is unreasonable under the circumstances; the
general utility of the defendant's conduct is weighed in light of its social
utility to the general public against the gravity of the harm caused."
Thus, in Coxsey v. Hallaby, a 1964 sonic boom case which arose during
sonic tests being conducted in Oklahoma City, where residents of the city
sought to enjoin continuation of the test by the Federal Aviation Agency,
the court held that the federal courts lacked jurisdiction under these cir-
cumstances because the test program was authorized by federal statute and
the United States had not consented to the suit."' It is clear that the national
public has an interest in supersonic flight tests for ultimate purposes of
national defense. However, it may also be argued that testing over popu-
lated areas is unreasonable and creates a nuisance.
There have been actions to recover compensation for an unconstitutional
taking of land, not based upon the FTCA."' However, in sonic boom cases
there is little basis for arguing an unconstitutional taking because the case
law has ruled that the act must be intentional and "repetitive and cumula-
tive."93 Since a sonic boom is generally limited to a single act, there is little
basis for establishing the required intent to acquire a proprietary interest
in private land.
One case, Bennett v. United States, has specifically held that there can
be no taking on the grounds of alleged sonic boom damages. "Physical
invasion of ... shock waves . . . [does] not constitute a taking of property
as opposed to a mere nuisance and trespass.""M
In Neher, the court held that aircraft-generated noises, shocks, and
vibrations descending upon plaintiff's building did not render noises com-
pensable under the Fifth Amendment where there was no physical invasion
by low and frequent flights directly and immediately interfering with use
and enjoyment of land. It noted that these flights were supersonic flights
8 PROSSER, supra note 28, at 595 (1964).
89RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 827, comment b (1939); PROSSER, 64 (1964).
90 PROSSER, supra note 28, at 616.
91 334 F.2d 287 (1964).
91228 U.S.C. § 1346(a) (2) [The Tucker Act, an alternative to the FTCA-for alleged uncon-
stitutional takings].
93 Bartholomae Corp. v. U.S., 135 F. Supp. 651 (S.D. Cal. 1955); Harris v. U.S., 205 F.2d 765
(10th Cir. 1953); Portsmouth Co. v. U.S., 260 U.S. 327 (1922); U.S. v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256
(1946).
94266 F. Supp. 627 (W.D. Okla. 1965).
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made at heights within public domain navigable airspace, and therefore
the plaintiffs allegation did not suffice to show an uncompensated taking or
inverse condemnation which violated the Fifth Amendment9'
IV. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF GRAVELLE
In the instant case, United States v. Gravelle, there is no "discretionary
function" determination to be made under the provisions of the FTCA
because the government waived its immunity. In both Gravelle and Neber
the negligence attributed to the government by the court clearly falls
within the "discretionary function" exception to the general FTCA rule
of tort liability of the United States. There was no claim by plaintiffs in
either case that the Air Force pilots "operated" their aircraft in a negligent
manner." The negligence was to be found at the federal planning level
in the decision to adopt a plan for a supersonic air corridor, or to conduct
sonic boom tests, over populated areas. Therefore, except for the waiving
of its immunity under this exception to the FTCA, the court in both
instances would have been without jurisdiction to determine the litigation.
In Schubert v. United States the court ruled that the selection of location
for the testing of jet engines was a policy decision within the exception
of the FTCA even if negligence were shown in the making of the selec-
tion."
The findings of the district court adopted and approved the Report of
the Special Masters, which found the government liable for the property
damages suffered by the plaintiffs on the following grounds: (1) That the
scientific evidence introduced by the government did not negate the factual
evidence offered by the plaintiff; and (2) that the damages sustained dur-
ing the sonic boom flights was "proximately" caused by sonic boom. It
is to be noted that the critical issue in this case was the determination of
"proximate causation" around which any issue as to the measure of dam-
ages must depend.
The gist of the government's argument was that the sonic boom did
not cause damage to the plaintiffs' property. The question of whether the
sonic booms caused the claimed damages turned on knowledge not within
the realm of ordinary human experience. In the circumstances of this case,
proof of damage to plaintiff's properties caused by sonic boom necessarily
turned on scientific knowledge, as it involved the application of the prin-
ciples of physics to an area not within the experience of the ordinary lay-
man; the burden of proof of causation must be met by the introduction
of scientific expert evidence. In discounting the value of lay testimony of
the probability of causation of damages, the government's principal wit-
ness, a physicist, testified that because human irritation has a lower thres-
hold to auditory and motion stimuli, a human being would be more
sensitive to vibrations than structures, and a person would tend to think
his house was cracking up when in fact it was not. As such, the govern-
95 265 F. Supp. 216 (D.C. Minn. 1967).
'
6 Nchcr v. U.S., 265 F. Supp. 209 (1967).
97 246 F. Supp. 170 (S.D. Tex. 1965), 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a).
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ment alleged that under Oklahoma law the plaintiffs were required to
introduce expert evidence in support of their case. The government re-
jected testimony of plaintiffs' experts as not meeting the accepted standards
and thus utterly lacking in probative value. This criticism was based on
the plaintiffs' experts' refusal to concur as to the validity of the scientific
data offered in evidence by the government, and such testimony was labeled
"sheer speculation" which thus must be irrelevant for failure to take into
account basic "accepted" facts. 8
The government also alleged that its overwhelming data based on actual
tests and sound engineering principles reduced any testimony of the plain-
tiffs' witnesses (lay and expert) concerning causation to mere speculation
concerning what was possible; plaintiff's proof, then, fell far short of the
required standard (i.e., "probability, not possibility") as to the burden
of proof."
Although the court accepted the premise that humans have a lower
irritability threshold to auditory stimuli than structures, it rejected the
government's argument that the lay witnesses were legally incompetent
to testify as to the issue of causation.
The lay witnesses could not, of course, competently testify as to the forces
that sonic booms create for such a subject requires specialized knowledge
and understanding. However, the desirability or need for expertise in testimony
probing an ultimate fact does not preclude, as a matter of law, all other
evidence for "expert evidence does not foreclose lay testimony concerning the
same matter which is within the knowledge and comprehension of the lay
witness.'
The strength of the plaintiffs' case was dependent upon an acceptance of
the testimony of the lay witnesses by both the factfinder and the expert
witnesses called by the appellees. With the expert testimony in noticeable
dispute, lay testimony (especially actual eyewitness testimony that the
damage occurred at the instant of the boom) became extremely important
in satisfying the mere preponderance of evidence requirement that Gravelle
has endorsed. The general rule is that if the conclusion requires more than
the common knowledge of the layman, expert testimony must be obtained
to determine the issues. However, even on technical issues of causation, lay
testimony is acceptable where the court deems the lay witness competent
to judge such matters.1"'
The general rule cited by the government, that "expert opinion that
fails to take into account basic and undisputed facts is sheer speculation,"
was not challenged by the court. However, the court held the rule in-
applicable to the case at bar and ruled that the plaintiffs "were not bound
to accept the scientific data advanced by the government as undisputed
fact or as leading to scientific certainty.' The court rejected, as not con-
98 407 F.2d 968 (10th Cir. 1964).
9 Id.
"
00 Id. at 967.
001 PROSSER, supra note 28, at 245; Mitchell v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 11 App. Div. 2d 579,
200 N.Y.S.2d 478 (1960).
102 407 F.2d 969 (10th Cir. 1969).
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clusive, the data obtained at the White Sands testing center. It recited a
number of reasons which cast doubt on the government's calculations.
For example, the government's data was silent as to the effect of shock
waves on different geological areas. The sub-soil at White Sands is stable;
in Oklahoma City it is fractured, and thus the greater potential of shock
wave magnification is raised in the Oklahoma City area. Another variable
not considered by the government's experts was that the strength of a
sonic boom may vary with atmospheric conditions, climate conditions,
and other factors with a potential boom area up to 20 miles. Overpressures
are believed to vary throughout the boom area with a probability that
some area away from the flight path may have greater pressures or shock
waves than that immediately under the flight path. Only three locations
were used to register overpressures in Oklahoma City with acknowledged
variation throughout the boom area, and thus the possibility was raised
that the pressures may have been greater at points where accelerometers
were not used. Finally, a third weakness in the application of the White
Sands results to the Oklahoma City area without qualification was raised
by the occurrence of structural fatigue. Different materials have different
"breaking points;" yet the White Sands test did not include "old brick"
structures, while the majority of plaintiffs in the instant case owned "old
brick" residences. It is further acknowledged that the age of the material
will affect its breaking point or the amount of stress the material could
withstand. It follows, logically at best, that a shock wave applied to struc-
tural material over a six-month period (1,253 booms), especially where the
stress condition is greater in an older home, can cause structural fatigue
and breakage."°' Thus, the court concluded that the testimony of appellees'
experts "was not faulty through a failure to consider undisputed and de-
terminative scientific facts."''
As to proof of causation, the court observed that "ordinarily, proof of
causation must rise higher than the presentation of mere alternative possi-
bilities and must reach the level of reasonable probability.' '.5 The court
then noted that in light of the absence of scientific certainty, and indeed
contradicting belief among the experts, as to the extent of damage that a
sonic boom can cause, the plaintiffs "cannot be held to a standard of proof
impossible for them to sustain under the circumstances here imposed on
them by the deliberate acts of the government. The quality of proof under
such circumstances can only be, and need only be, minimal."'' This
standard was met by expert opinion for the plaintiffs which established
that the property damage was "likely" caused by sonic boom. This expert
opinion was based on technical knowledge of sonic boom, the history of
the property concerned, and actual eye witness testimony to the damages
incurred." 7
Normally, in an action for negligence, evidence must be introduced
103 Id. at 967.
104Id. at 968.
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which establishes a reasonable basis that "it is more likely than not that
the conduct of the defendant was the substantial factor in bringing about
the result.'.. 8 Although the plaintiff is not required to prove his case be-
yond a reasonable doubt, a mere possibility of such causation is not enough,
and where the matter remains one of pure speculation or conjecture, or
the probabilities are at best evenly balanced, it is the duty of the court to
direct a verdict for the defendant.10 9
Therefore, it seems particularly significant that the court in Gravelle
expressly relaxed the traditional rules probing causation, (i.e., "reasonable
probability"), and allowed, under the particular circumstances of this
case, that proximate cause could be established by a mere preponderance of
evidence. There seems to be a subtle implication of the application of the
doctrine of strict liability in the reasoning of the court toward the prob-
lems in this case, which the court notes, are unique. These problems must
be solved by "pragmatically projecting them against the total circum-
stances of the case."".. This is not a case of an isolated, unintentional sonic
boom, but rather is one of an intentional series of sonic booms over a
densely populated area to determine the effect on the inhabitants and
structures. The government exposed the property and person of the plain-
tiffs to a deliberate tort for the very purpose of determining what, if any,
damage would result to property and person. The fact that several of the
structures were in a weakened condition, or in a condition of partial de-
terioration, at the time of the sonic boom flights, and were thus more
susceptible to damage than more sound structures, should not excuse the
government from liability. Certainly the defendant knew or should have
known that many buildings in the Oklahoma City area were in this con-
dition at the time the flights were commenced and that such damage would
result. As in Neher, the court in declining to accept the government's
scientific data as conclusive and therefore binding on the court, refused to
allow the government to escape liability where it subjected a large popu-
lated area to the potential for harm that may be inflicted by sonic boom."'
The court has established a probative standard of causation applicable
only to sonic boom litigation. This standard is responsive to the problem
of the plaintiff who is faced with arguing scientific certainty in an area
where absolute information is nonexistent. As the court pointed out, if
the lay testimony may be eliminated as technically unreliable concerning
causation and if the testimony of the plaintiffs' experts is limited to proven
scientific data, then the plaintiffs' case must fail because no such data
exists unless the White Sands and Oklahoma City tests are to be accepted
as conclusive."' In other words, the plaintiffs would then be held to a
108 PROSSER, supra note 28, at 245.
'°9Id.; Kramer Service v. Wilkins, 184 Miss. 483, 186 So. 825 (1939); Rutherford v. Modern
Bakery, 310 S.W.2d 274 (Ky. 1958); Wintersteen v. Semler, 197 Ore. 601, 255 P.2d 138 (1953);
Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Hamilton Bros., 192 F.2d 817 (8th Cir. 1951); Orth v. St. Paul
M. & M. R. Co., 47 Minn. 384, 50 N.W. 363 (1891); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. West, 382 Pa. 425,
115 A.2d 227 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955).
"0407 F.2d 968 (10th Cir. 1964).
"'. 265 F. Supp. 209 (N.D. Ill. 1967).
112407 F.2d 969 (10th Cir. 1964).
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standard of proof impossible to sustain under the circumstances here im-
posed on them by the government.
However, in the instant case (and in Neher) the challenges to the
government's data by experts appearing for the plaintiffs have indeed
thrust considerable doubt on the conclusiveness of this evidence. In earlier
sonic boom cases the plaintiffs, who were unable to find recognized expert
authority to testify on the "cause-effect" issue of sonic boom, were forced
to rely on presenting their own "gut-impressions" as to the issue of proxi-
mate causation. The courts, in these earlier cases, were more impressed
with the test-evaluated calculations presented in evidence by the govern-
ment than by a layman's "opinion" that sonic boom had damaged his
property.
Also, it is significant to note that in both Neher and the instant case,
"legal" proximate cause was held to be sufficiently established if the evi-
dence introduced showed that the sonic booms necessarily set into operation
a factor which accomplished the damage. " ' However, it must be understood
that the evidentiary rules which the court held applicable to the instant
case might not be held to be the appropriate test in sonic boom cases in-
volving different facts, as where alleged damages occur in relatively isolated
demographic areas instead of being produced over largely populated ones.
The government also challenged the district court finding that the
damage caused was not "de minimus." The court rejected this position
noting the challenge was premised upon the White Sands test showing only
hairline damage at the test site, which findings the court refused to accept
as absolute."'
V. CONCLUSION
That sonic boom is capable of causing property damage is a proposition
that cannot be doubted. The claimant seeking relief under the FTCA,
assuming that the burden of proof with respect to the discretionary excep-
tion function has been sustained or waived, is still faced with the evi-
dentiary difficulty of establishing the necessary elements of his case: (1)
The proximate causation of the damage was a sonic boom, (2) the damage
was caused by ". . . an employee of the government, and (3) that em-
ployee was "acting within the scope of his employment."''. Indeed the
problem of proof in the area of sonic boom damage is excessively burden-
some and complex. In the two most recent cases, Neher and Gravelle, the
courts seem to be expressing dissatisfaction with the legal entanglements
the wholly innocent landowner is forced to overcome in order to establish
his claim for just and reasonable compensation. It is suggested, therefore,
that strict liability should be found applicable against the government in
the case of damaging sonic booms. The operation of supersonic aircraft is
deemed certain to cause some damage which cannot be eliminated by the
"'.265 F. Supp. 209, 218 (N.D. I11. 1967).
114 Id.
" 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1952).
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exercise of the utmost care, and therefore it should be treated as an ultra-
hazardous activity.
The Oklahoma City sonic boom tests (where flight procedures were
regulated to keep overpressures within a non-damaging range) indicated
that boom "scatter" or variation (due to wind velocity, temperature, ter-
rain features, humidity, boundary layer turbulence, and other meteoro-
logical parameters) 11 cause one boom in a thousand, at every point in the
boom "carpet" or path which will be 50 to 80 miles wide, to be twice as
strong as the mean strength of the flight track for a series of flights."'
Thus, where flights are planned so that boom-caused overpressures will be
only 1.5 pounds per square foot during the flight and 2 pounds per square
foot on takeoff, the overpressures from one flight in a thousand will be
3 to 4 pounds per square foot which will cause considerable damage to
glass and plaster, as well as minor structural damage to frames and walls. "'
Therefore, the very operation of supersonic aircraft may involve a risk
of serious harm to property which cannot be eliminated by the exercise
of the utmost care, and since supersonic flying is not a matter of common
usage, such operations might be deemed ultra-hazardous."' In view of
the general principle that operators of ultra-hazardous activities are held
strictly liable, the operators of supersonic aircraft should stand as insurers
for all damage proximately caused by sonic booms."0
Certainly it may be argued that the government is in a better position
than the individual property owner to develop better techniques to solve
the problems caused by sonic booms and thus to prevent them. Only if
technology and procedures advance to the point where all damage can
be eliminated by the exercise of due care, should the courts refuse to find
strict liability for boom damages; otherwise, the loss should pass through
the "deep pocket," and the innocent individual landowner should not be
made to suffer. "Res ipsa loquitur" (in jurisdictions where the doctrine is
recognized) will also be useful if strict liability is rejected. Indeed, as Mr.
Justice Black observed, dissenting in United States v. Causby;
Old concepts of private ownership of land should not be introduced into
the fields of air regulation .... The noise of newer, larger, and more powerful
planes may grow louder and louder and disturb people more and more. But
the solution of the problems precipitated by these technological advances and
new ways of living cannot come about through application of rigid constitu-
tional restraints formulated and enforced by the courts.''
Robert D. Batson
116 Power, Some Results of Oklahoma City Sonic Boom Tests, 4 MATERIALS RES. & STAND. 618
(1964).
"' Lundburg, Supersonic Boom, THE ROTARIAN, Nov. 1966, at 55.
11
8 Id. at 55.
ssORESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 520, comment (e) (1938).
12 See Whitley, supra note 62, at 647.
12' 328 U.S. 256, 274 (1945); 2 GA. L. REv. 83, 100 (1967).
1970]
